Thank you for your quick response.
I went with setting cookies approach, selecting the proper backend based
on the cookie, I'm not doing any redirect, if the cookie is set HAProxy
forward the request to backend A, if not forward to backend B.
Both backends A and B are similar and tries to set a cookie on the
client browser, so the end user wont feel any difference and wont be
bothered with a redirect, if any attack happens, backend B will be
affected, regular users with the cookie will go to backend A.
I've tested it with ab to stress the frontend, and it works pretty well.
backend A was not affected at all while backend B was busy with many
Thanks for the important tips.
Willy Tarreau wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:43:53PM +0300, Ahmad Al-Ibrahim wrote:
>> I'm using HAProxy in the frontend as a reverse proxy to backend servers,
>> I'm thinking of possible ways to protect backend servers from being
>> How effective is doing url redirect to protect against these attacks?
> it will stop all stupid bots which don't even care about parsing the
> response. You can even improve the setup by setting a cookie and
> checking it in response. The idea is that if the cookie is there and
> valid, you forward the traffic to the proper backend. Otherwise you
> perform a redirect with a set-cookie.
>> Or balancing based on URI?
> This will most often overload one server which matches the URI being
> attacked. In most of the DDoS traces I got, only one URI was being
> requested by thousands of clients.
>> How about using cookies? for example Logged in users with Cookie A goes
>> to backend group A and clients with no cookie set go to backend group x
> see above ;-)
> Keep in mind that some people don't like this solution because they
> fear that some people will not get the cookie. I've once set up a
> 2-steps redirect for that. The principle is easy :
> 1) if uri = /XXX and no cookie, return error page
> 2) redirect to /XXX with set-cookie if no cookie
> 3) if uri = /XXX, redirect to /
> /XXX will catch clients which don't support cookies and gently return
> them an error. One could also decide to slow them down but granting
> them access to the service, or limiting their number of connections
> (dedicated backend).
>> There is conn tarpit, how effective it is? and how it can be used to
>> protect against DDoS attacks?
> It is very effective. I developped it in a hurry to help one guy
> whose site was set down by a medium-sized attack. Once the tarpit
> was installed with a proper criteria, we observed the number of
> concurrent connection go up to stabilize at about 7K, and the load
> on the servers and the frontend firewall dropped.
> The tarpit was developped precisely to protect the frontend firewall
> and the internet link, because most attack tools will simply run a
> dirty request in a loop and can't parallelize them. So if you're
> slowing down an attacker to one request per minute, you're saved.
> The difficulty is to find the matching criteria. You have to check
> your servers logs to see what causes them trouble, and if you can't
> blacklist the uri itself, you often have to fire up tcpdump. It's
> very common to find an uncommon header, a wrong syntax or something
> like this in the request. You then use that to decide to tarpit the
>> What is the most effective way to protect against such DDoS attacks?
> there's no most effective way. There's only a combination of tools
> which have an efficiency depending on the attacker's skills and
> knowledge of your counter-measures. So there are a number of important
> rules to keep in mind :
> 1) you have the logs, the attacker does not. Exploit them to the
> maximum to elaborate the smartest possible matching.
> 2) you know what he does and he does not know what you do. You
> must never let the attacker know what you're doing nor how you
> plan to stop him. Reporting wrong information is nice too. For
> instance, the tarpit will return 500 after the timeout with a
> fake server error. But you can also decide to sacrifice a server
> and send all identified crap to it. This is very important
> because every method of filtering will have limits which can
> easily be bypassed with a few minutes or hours of coding once
> understood. You must ensure that your attacker does not even
> know what products you are using.
> 3) he knows who you are (IP) and you don't know behind what IP he
> hides. This is the problematic part because you don't want to
> block your customers on your site.
> 4) you have to constantly monitor your systems and adapt the
> response to the attack in real time. This prevents the attacker
> from getting a precise idea of your architecture and components,
> which would serve him to build an effective attack. Also, you'll
> have to adjust system tuning (eg: number of SYN/ACK retries,
> timeouts, etc...), balancing between protection efficiency and
> the site accessibility for normal users.
> 5) you must not publicly tell your customers that you're being
> attacked because if the attacker sees that, he will think
> "hey, they can't stand it anymore, they're about to give up",
> and they will continue. However, stating that "the site is
> slow due to a transient network issue" is fine.
> 6) never over-estimate the capability of any of your components,
> and do not hesitate to replace one which does not fit anymore.
> For instance, if you use haproxy and you see the attack is
> smart enough to kick it off, put something in front of it,
> replace it or find any trick to quickly solve the issue.
> Source-based layer 4 balancing to many L7 proxies is very
> effective BTW. If you can stuff 10 machines with haproxy,
> each of which will sustain 50000 concurrent connections,
> and a layer4 LB in front of them, you can sustain 500K
> concurrent L7 connections (including tarpit) for not that
> much of money.
> 7) the internet link can quickly become the bottleneck, so you
> have to push the attack back to the attackers at the earliest
> possible opportunity. Randomly dropping incoming packets is
> wrong because those packets will be retransmitted, thus will
> increase the link volume. However, redirections, tarpits and
> such things are fine because you can often limit the amount
> of traffic exchanged with an attacker. But once the link is
> full, you're hosed. Today, a Gig pipe can be filled by only
> 1000 ADSL2 clients sending dirty traffic, so this type of
> attack is very very cheap.
> 8) save all your confs before starting to change settings,
> otherwise you'll forget to restore a lof of them once the
> attack is over.
Received on 2009/02/26 02:07